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MENS REA AND THE LAW WITHOUT IT
RATIONALE AND THE WEST VIRGINIA RULE*
GERHARD 0.

M

W.

*

MUELLER *

.

NS REA means evil mind., It is, therefore, a psychoA
ethical concept. 2 The law has employed it as a legal concept, signifying that frame of mind which accompanies, and sometimes, in addition, precedes, the evil act, actus reus. The combination of the two provides for criminality under law, 3 and has been

embodied in the negatively phrased maxim: actus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea.4
"There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil
mind. In other words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness. Neither in philosophical speculation, nor in religious
or moral sentiment, would any people in any age allow that
a man sho.uld be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of
every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful
intent, without which it cannot exist."5
Since time immemorial mens rea has been a condition of
criminality, though not always under that name. Most earlier
researchers believed that originally all criminal liability was absolute, i.e, that mens rea was an unknown, and that penal liability
was imposed for the harmful act, regardless of the wrongdoer's frame
of mind. Elsewhere I hope to have shown that such views are
erroneous. 6 It is conceded that primitive law judges typical and
schematic views. But it is improper to conchide that mens rea
was of no concern. 7 Primitive law did and does even distinguish
between forms of mens rea, usually intention and negligence.
Monks and scholars trained in Roman and Canon law imported
* The introductory part of this essay is based on a thesis written in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of LL.M. at the School of Law,
Columbia University.

For valuable criticism I am deeply indebted

to Mr.

Herbert Wechsler, Professor of Law at Columbia University.

" A.B., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law.
I Lit. mind evil.
2 Frequently it has been said that mens rea means blameworthiness.
not a literal translation,

this is a helpful characterization

While

of the concept in

terms of the purpose which it serves or ought to serve.
3 Under law-nullum crimen sine lege.

4 An act is not made evil--criminal-unless the mind is evil--criminal, which
has been called "one of 'Coke's scraps of Latin'." See note, The Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 13 CRiM.L. MAG. 831 (1891).
51 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW 192-193 (9th ed., Zane & Zollman 1928).
6 MEzER, Crime, Tort and the Primitive, 46 J. CpUM. L., C. & P.S. 303
(1955).
7 See also 4 BINDING, Dm NOaaRmN UND IMm UEBER rI ,UNG
12-13 (1919).
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the Roman form of mens rea, namely dolus and culpa, or intent
and negligence, to England. The familiarity with these concepts
made the English mens rea more rigid; it did not, however, found it.s
While negligence usually is flavored with an ingredient of
ethical disapproval,9 intention is an ethically indifferent concept.
It acquires a value only when used in context. The law uses it in
only one context, as a form of mens rea. Mens rea, by the very
ingredient, rea, however, is quite decidedly a term with an ethical
value, for evil and good are terms of ethics, not of law. The law,
of course, can declare certain acts prohibited and leave others permissible. An ethical law, moreover, will not prohibit acts that
are ethical. Such was precisely the position of the common law at
one time. The sphere of the ethical acts coincided with the sphere
of the lawful acts, the sphere of the unethical acts coincided with
the sphere of prohibited acts, of which crimes were the gravest. 0
A criminal act, thus, was an evil act, actus reus. Consequently,
the frame of mind accompanying the evil act was an evil mind,
mens rea.
Thus did mens rea acquire its ethical flavor with which the
twentieth century knows little what to do, for all that is being
remembered today is the fact that mens rea is the intent to do that
which in fact amounts to a crime, or the doing so by negligence.
It has been forgotten that no longer do the spheres of evil acts
and of prohibited acts coincide. The sphere of crime is no longer
that body of disapproved conduct which is a cultural heritage of
a people and known to every sane adult to be so. Law and ethics
no longer grow together at the same pace. The law stepped faster,
too fast to be absorbed into the body of the rules of ethics, of
culture. Thousands of regulatory offenses in all areas of commercial, industrial and social endeavor have been created, which no
mortal can possibly all know by heart, nor be aware of at all times.While, thus, in medieval days the doing of an act which amounted
to a breach of public law, with the intent to do so, could be considered virtually conclusive evidence of an evil mind, unless it
8 False: Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in Criminal Law,
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 401 (1934).

9 The disregard, or lack of interest, for the interests of the community,
or of others.
10 Breaches of promise, torts, crimes. "Criminal liability imports a condemnation, the gravest we permit ourselves to make." Wechsler, A Thoughtful
Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. Cman. L., C. & P.S., 524, 528 (1955).
11The constitutional aspects of the creation of crimes out of formerly
indifferent acts, as well as the justness of such laws, have been aptly discussed
in a mens rea conscious article by Laylin and Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment, 20 MicH. L. Rav. 614 (1922).
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could be established that the offender had no mind at all, i.e., was
insane, or that the act was accidental, this is no longer the case
today. The doing of an act which happens to be contrary to a
regulatory statute, while indicating an intent, or perhaps (nonlegal) negligence, does not tell us anything about the defendant's
mens rea. To be quite sure, if it were established that the defendant
knew of the regulatory statute, and committed the act nevertheless
with awareness of all material facts, his mind would be evil. But
he may very well not have known of the statute, nor have had an
opportunity to know it or to know about it. If so, his act was not
accompanied by an evil mind, for it is a fiction and an utter
farce to say under today's circumstances that everybody is irrebuttably presumed to know the law. But by presuming that the
defendant did know the law, it is now reasoned that despite such
knowledge of the law he breached it, evidencing thereby an evil
intent to do so. He had mens tea.1 2 Fiction aside, the fact is that
we do not know whether the defendant had an evil mind, nor do
we know whether he knew that his act was contrary to statute, nor,
under such laws, are we supposed to care about that at all, since
errorjuris nocet." Hence, today we take the risk that a defendant
may be convicted although he did not have mens rea. All we know
is that he had mens, namely the ethically indifferent intent to do
that which happened to amount to a breach of the law. His forefathers were guided by what they knew to be evil; he has no longer
such a guidance. 4 Thus, in a large sphere of criminality, actus reus
has lost its reus, mens tea has lost its rea. The only thing that
has remained constant is the phrase that mens rea is the intending to
do that which is forbidden by law, or the doing so by negligence.
The law has grown fast, ethics have grown barely. Hence the
discrepancy.
Let us remind ourselves that when we talk of mens rea in connection with crimes or violations which do not have a counterpart
in the culture of the people, we really mean only mens, and that
imposition of liability for such offences without mens rea is likely
to be conviction for acts that in fact were not accompanied by an
evil mind. But the imposition of criminal liability without estab12 Many statutes took an even easier path, by simply declaring that for the
purpose of this statute no mens rea whatsoever is required. Infra, n. 44.
1. Error of law does not excuse; also in the form ignorantia legis neminen
excusat, ignorance of the law excuses nobody.
14It
is rather doubtful that the prescriptions and proscriptions of all the
regulatory statutes and ordinances will ever become part of the cultural heritage
and common knowledge, as are "true" crimes, unless they are sung on the
weekly hit parades and published in the form of comic books.
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lishing an evil mind is strict liability, i.e., strict liability which did
not exist prior to the influx of regulatory legislation.
It follows then that in the area of regulatory offenses the application of the maxim error juris nocet works, or may work, considerable hardship, inconsistent with another salient principle of our
criminal law: that it is better for ninety-nine guilty men to be acquitted than that one innocent man be punished.15 The existence of a
statute regulating conduct which, absent such statute, would be
perfectly permissible and lawful is in itself a fact. You and I
and every sane citizen know that it is criminal to steal and to
murder. But who knows that if he permits Canadian thistles to
grow to maturity in his backyard he commits an offense against
the government? 6
It may be argued that adherence to the maxim errorjuris nocet
does not really work many hardships, because most of the regulatory
offenses are of a local nature, aimed at local evils. Thus, the local
residents would be familiar with both the evil and the statute or
ordinance. Other regulatory offenses, it can be said, apply only
to certain occupations, industries, or activities, ranging anywhere
from trout fishing and dog walking to mixing highly explosive
chemicals .1 Persons thus employed would be simply reckless
not to keep informed about all laws and regulations governing
their activities. If they fail to do so punishment will hit them
justly, and will serve as a warning to use greater care-or not to be
forgetful-in keeping posted on the law in the future. There is
much truth in these arguments. Nevertheless, none of them attempts to refute the fact that unjust convictions for violations are
indeed possible and, in fact, occur often. Not even greatest care
can always assure knowledge of the innumerous regulatory statutes
which govern our daily life. Rather than to frustrate the community at large by ignoring the citizen's good faith and holding
him guilty of a breach of the law based on intolerable fiction, the
defendant should be permitted to establish his non-negligent ignorance of, or mistake about, a regulatory law, as an absolute
defense. Only such a rule will secure just convictions and thereby
exercise a deterrent effect.18
15 But we would be poor administrators indeed if we could not do better
than to bring one of 100 truly guilty men to justice.
16 Story v. People, 79 Ill. App. 562 (1898) was a prosecution for violation of
a Canadian thistle statute. The issue was, however, mistake of fact, rather than
mistake of law.
17 Thus, in Story v. People, supra n. 16, the offense was of both local and
occupational importance for the defendant, and he was aware of the statute.
18 For an excellent discussion see HALL, GEnIuL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
c. 11, esp. 572-376 (1947).
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Far from recognizing that in the area of regulatory penal
law the existence of a law is a question of fact, ignorance of which
should be excused, as is and was the rule at common law, a more
active sin has been added to this passive one. For an example
let us return to the imaginary gentleman with Canadian thistles in
his backyard. Suppose he knows about the Canadian Thistle
Law. Eagerly he tears out all thistles which a reputable biologist
of the Hometown University had pointed out to him as Canadian
thistles (Carduus arvensis). Unfortunately, the biologist had committed an honest mistake, thus permitting our gentleman backyardfarmer to become an unwilling law breaker, since his Canadian
thistles flourished to maturity. Will the law excuse him on account
of his bona fide reliance on an expert's honest mistake, and the
bona fide effort to use all care for complying with the law? No,"
chances are that the court will not even permit him to introduce
his defense. The rule has developed that in all regulatory penal
law mistake of fact is no defense.20 Thus, the ancient and sacrosanct maxim of the common law actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea has been abrogated in a major part of our penal law today.21
The reasons for such an anomaly have been variously stated:
If mens rea were required, (1) the enforcement of the statute would
be impeded; or (2) the courts would be overburdened; or (3)
justice would be hampered; or (4) fraudulent defenses could be
fabricated, etc. Prima fade such claims can be just as easily made
as refuted. The often stated reason here listed under (1), for
instance, seems to be nothing more than a woman's "because", and
proves no more.
(2), supra, is a little more specific. It is certainly true that
there is hardly any aspect of human activity which has escaped
control by the law. When we eat, the (pure food and drug) law
eats with us; when we walk, the (traffic) law walks with us; and
29 Accord: Laird v. Dobell, [1906] 1 K.B. 131.
2O0
This maxim, considered by some as the conversion of the principle of
mens tea, is one of the finest examples demonstrating the ethical origin of the
mnens rea concept. The mind was considered not to have been evil if the
perpetrator acted under such a mistaken belief of the factual circumstances
that, if all had been as he imagined, he would have acted lawfully.
21 It may be true, as Chief Justice Vinson stated in Dennis v. United States,
341 U. S. 494, 500 (1951), that "[tjhe existence of a mens rea is the rule of,
rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal juris.
prudence." (Incidentally, the civil law makes considerably less use of absolute
criminal liability.) But the petty offenses which constitute the exceptions stirpass numerically by far the prosecutions for crimes that still are subject to
common law mens rea. In fact, it is all but conceded that the liability for
violations of city ordinances-a huge bulk of penal legislation-is an absolute
one as a rule. See 9 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 675-682. (3d ed.,
Smith et al. 1950).
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even the health and soundness of our sleep is regulated by law.To litigate every one of the regulated problems of daily life would
surely hamper the administration of justice. 21 But what good will
it do to punish indiscriminately, regardless of guilt or innocence,
merely to save the time it would take to determine the validity of
a defense? And what of the deterrent effect of such a frustrating
law? Would it not ease the burden on the court and reduce the
length of the court calendar much more if, for instance, in January
we would prosecute only blond culprits, in February only bald ones,
in March brunettes, etc? That would at least deter some of the
culprits some of the time, whereas absolute criminal liability is
totally without deterrent effect. But more of that later.
Ad (3) it might be answered that absolute criminal liability
surely is not the vehicle to unhamper criminal justice. If anything,
it does away with justice altogether by distributing penalties indiscriminately. Ad (4) it will suffice to ask: what crime is there
which is not subject to the interposition of fraudulent defenses?
Surely the temptation for tricking one's way out of a jam is much
greater in crimes threatening serious consequences than it is in petty
offenses.
Our legal literature lacks any thorough inquiry into the
veracity of such claims. Only a major inquiry, delving deeply into
the problem can ultimately lead us to the sound law. This paper
will do no more than to sketch the development and rationale,
or rather irrationale, of absolute criminal liability. It will discuss
mainly West Virginia law, and will use West Virginia cases and
statutes as examples.
It is regrettable that, absent a major inquiry and enlightenment, the law muddles along unintelligently. While the unsoundness of absolute criminal liability has been recognized by leading
American scholars 2 4 there is only little encouraging official action.
At its recent meeting the American Law Institute approved section
2.05 of the Model Penal Code which sanctions absolute liability for
. E.g., D.C. CODE tit. 6, c. 6.
-3 A list of the categories of statutes not requiring mens rea, as just
explained, may be found at Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoL. L. R v.
55, 77, 78 (1933), reprinted at MIICIiAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

ADMINISTRATION 783 (1940); and see A.L.1., MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft. No.

4, 141-145, 1955).
24 E.g., Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Lan,, 45 J. CaM. L.,
C. & P.S. 524, 527-528 (1955); id., The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22
U. CI. L. REv. 367, 374 (1955); id. The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65
HARV. L. Rv. 1097, passim (1952); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
c. 10 (1947).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss1/4

6

Mueller: Mens Rea and the Law Without It: Rationale and the West Virginia

MENS REA AND THE LAW
25
I
violations, banning it only from misdemeanors and felonies.
suppose we have to be grateful for the action of the Institute, as
the new section would at least prevent imprisonment for innocent
wrongdoers, fines being the only penal consequence for violations.
The comments to section 2.05 are full of good intentions and noble
purposes, and should be readily approved. But they fall short
of explaining why absolute criminal liability should be retained
at all, even in its minimal form.2 6 Before going on with the discussion of absolute criminal liabilty in the regulatory field, the
law of violations, a few more words will have to be said about
mens rea itself, and about the common law position on mens rea.
It has been contended that there is no singular concept of
mens rea, but that every crime requires a different mens rea, that
today mens rea is a plural concept and, unless used in connection
with a specific crime, ought to be considered as mentes reae.2 T Mr.
Sayre, who coined the term "mentes reae",28 had become conscious
of the fact that a number of crimes require more, by way of a
subjective element, than the mere intent to do that which amounts
to a commensurate, and criminal, act. For instance, murder may
require "malice aforethought", a special addition to the mere intent
to kill. Thus, while ordinarily mens rea and act are commensurate
-in the case of intent-, in the case of murder mens rea may be out
of proportion to the act of killing. There are a number of similar
instances both at common law and at civil law. For the purpose
of selecting the most effective deterrents, the law has here deemed
it wise to attach a higher amount of liability to an act if committed
with an especially evil motive or design. Do such modifications
substantially alter the basic concept of mens rea, or that part of
mens rea which all crimes have in common? If one remembers
that mens rea means evil mind, it is clear that Mr. Sayre confused
the form of the concept with its substance. Just as negligence is a
lower form of mens rea than (commensurate) intent, so malice
aforethought is a higher form than (commensurgte) intent. Similarly, carelessness, or heedlessness, the attitude of nonchalance in
the light of duty, is a lower form of mens rea than negligence.
Whatever the merit or demerit of all these various forms of mens
rea, which has been a matter of considerable debate, we can say
25

A.L.I.,

MODEL PENAL CODE

(Tent. Draft No. 4, 18-19, 1955).

261d. at 140.

27Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in Criminal Law, HARVARD
LEGAL EsSAYS 399, 402-403.
28 Stephen, J., fathered the thought in Regina v. Tolson, [1889] 23 Q.B.
168, passim, gen. see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW C. 5 (1947).
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that they have acquired a right to existence in the criminal law
by prescription.29 Mens rea, thus, is a singular concept, an element
of criminality, which may appear in any one of several possible
forms. The imposition of criminal liability does not follow every
finding of an act and a mens rea, or rather seeming mens rea, for
not every form of mens rea also has its substance. The law has
defined the occasions of "mens rea form without substance" in a
rigid system: "Mens rea does not lie, i.e., has form but no substance,
if the actor had a ground of justification for his act, or acted by
order of the law. Thus, in murder we prohibit the killing of a
human being with the intent to kill, but admit exceptions to the
rule, according to societal utility, such as the killing at war time,
the killing in self-defense, the official execution, etc. As the law
does not deem these instance of killing evil, the defendant who kills
under such circumstances with intent to kill, though he acted with
a form of mens rea, intent, has not had the substance of mens rea,
an evil mind. 0
It has sometimes been thought feasible to incorporate these
grounds of justification, as well as the defenses of insanity, infancy
etc., into the mens rea concept."' Such attempts have proved
abortive for the simple reason that grounds of justification exclude
all "rea"-eaving the "mens" a legally insignificant shell-and that
the exculpatory grounds exclude not only all "rea" but also all
mnens."3 2
So much by way of an explanation of mens rea. I shall next
have to mention those instances of the Anglo-American penal law,
other than regulatory violations, which are inconsistent with the
meaning of mens rea, which disregard it, in part or in toto, thereby
imposing partial or total strict liability.
It has been said frequently that the non-statutory common law
itself knows a number of exceptions to its avowed reliance on mens
29 Incidentally, it seems to be commonly recognized that carelessness is the
lowest form of mens rea. Nothing short of carelessness has ever been utilized
as mens rea for any statutory crime. The non-statutory common law did not
consider carelessness or heedlessness as mens rea at all.
:10
A thorough analysis of the various theories may be found at Michael and
Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COL. L. Rnv. 701, and 1261

(1937).

31 Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in Criminal Law, HARVARu
LIEGAL
3 ESSAYS 399, 403 (1934).

2 Anglo-American law has not recognized insanity and infancy as mitigating grounds when they are found to lower, rather than to exclude, the capacity
to form a legally significant mens rea. This may be unfortunate, but until such
a step is taken-which will probably be a good number of years after medical
science has convinced us of its necessity-these defenses cannot be said to affect,
or go into, the mens rea concept at all; they simply exclude it altogether.
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tea. These are said to lie in the areas of criminal libel, "' criminal
nuisance,3 4 and "domestic misdemeanors." ' , Such claims are usually
restricted to the liability of a person in the nature of a principal
for the unlawful acts and mens rea of a person in the nature of his
agent. Strictly speaking, these examples would constitute more
than criminality without mens rea. Not only does the person
against whom the law moves lack any mens rea, but he has not even
committed the proscribed act himself. This form of liability is in
the nature of vicarious liability, a form of liabilty otherwise known
only in tort law. Investigation has shown, moreover, that there
is little support for the belief in such instances, be they of direct
or vicarious absolute liability, as at common law,-"' some isolated
cases notwithstanding.
More important is the exception to the common law mens rea
requirement which has been created in the form of "result-qualification." Instances are the felony-murder rule and the misdemeanormanslaughter rule. Here the law imposes upon the perpetrator of
a felony, or a misdemeanor, as the case may be, the liability
(and punishment) for such an offence plus an additional liability (and punishment) for the death of a human being that
occurred as an incident to the basic crime.37
It is noteworthy
that tile law will not impose a liability on the actor unless he
evidenced at least some blameworthiness. He had "a" mens rea.
:':BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 219.2-221, 922-923 (9th ed., Zane & Zollman
1923); WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1964, 1990 (12th ed., Ruppenthal 1932);
BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 802 (1946); RUSSELL, CRIME C. 49 (10th ed., Turner
1950); CLAPKE & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 188 (e) (5th ed., Kearney 1952); SEARS AND
VEIHOFIEN, MAY'S CRIMINAL LAW § 38 (1938); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 80 (b)
1934); WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 77.1 (1953); TuRNra, KENNYS OtrrLINES OF
CRIMINAL LAW § 28 (1952); CROSS AND JONES, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW
art. 14 (3d ed. 1953).
34 BISHOP, op. cit. § 1075; WHARTON, op cit. §§ 1688, 1690, and § 287;
BURDICK, op. cit. §§ 887-891; RUSSELL, op. cit. at 1674 et seq.; CIARK AND
MARSHALL, op. cit. § 188 (f); SEARS AND WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. at 3, 44, 160; MILLER,
op. cit. at 248, 421; WILLIAMS, op. cit. § 77.2; TURWNER,
op. cit. §§ 28, 447; CROSS
AND JONES, op. cit. at 49, 68; BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY C. 10 (1916); Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARv. L. Rv. 688, 708-709
(1930).
(15SEARS AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. § 39; Perkins, The
Doctrine of Coercion,
19 IOWA L. REV. 507, 513-514 (1934); Notes, 31 YALE L.J. 337 (1922), 20 MICH.
L. Rrv. 547 (1922); Annot. 6 Am. Dec. 106, 33 Am. St. Rep. 88, 4 A.L.R. 266,
19 A.L.R. 136, 71 A.L.R. 1111.
36 Will be discussed elsewhere.
3
7 In West Virginia, as in a number of other states, the application of the
felony-murder (1st degree) rule has been wisely restricted to a few selected
crimes of particularly atrocious nature, i.e., arson, rape, robbery, and burglary, or
the attempt to commit any of these. W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 2, § 1 (Michle 1949),
applied in the controversial rape case State v. Beale, 104 W. Va. 617, 631, 141
S.E. 41 (1927). Likewise, the fatal result of an abortion will subject the offender
to liability for murder. W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 2, § 8 (Michie 1949). State v.
Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 601-602, 47 S.E.2d 513 (1949).
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However, his mens rea, namely in the form of an intent (to commit
the basic felony or misdemeanor) covered only the basic crime.
What, then, was his mens rea for the death incidental to the basic
crime? The defendant did not want such a death to occur, he
may not even have been negligent or careless in causing it. But
the law does not care about the measure of care and precaution
which the perpetrator has taken to avoid the occurrence of a
death. The law will impose liability for the death upon the
perpetrator of the basic crime as long as in fact the death would
not have occurred (as early as it did) had it not been for the intervention of the perpetrator's felony or misdemeanor, however uipredictable the chance of death was. Does the law carry the
perpetrator's mens rea of the crime over so as to cover the incidental death? This would be pure fiction. But whether we say we do
not care, or whether we create a fiction, the result is the same:
the death need not be covered by any form of mens rea, nor
need it be causally connected with the basic crime within the realm
of human foreseeability. 3s Such, then, is an incident of at least
partial criminal liability without fault.39
Next, there are a few late common law crimes-statutory creations, but usually and properly considered as "common law"-which
dispense with the mens rea requirement as to certain singled-out elements. It is said that with respect to these elements the actor acts
at his risk, and that the law will impose liability upon him despite
his blamelessness if in fact the condition was such as the law
requires for criminality. But with respect to other elements of
the crime, error of fact will excuse. For instance, the crime of
abduction has been held complete if in fact the girl abducted was
below the statutory age, no matter how careful the defendant
has been in his inquiries about the age of the girl. 40 Similar
instances can be found in a number of crimes. A particularly
grave incident is said to lie in the law of libel in some jurisdictions,
namely, with respect to the belief in the truth and lack of harmful
tendency of the matter published.
138 See Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony Murder Rule, (1952) WAsH.
U.L.Q. 191.
39 Namely with respect to the qualification, not with respect to the basic
crime. The increased punishment for the qualification cannot be viewed as
merely a matter of legislative pleasure on the distribution of punishment: if
act X plus mens rea X create a liability subject to punishment N, and act X
plus mens rea X plus result Y create a liability subject to punishment N plus 1,
then punishment 1 is based on liability without mens rea.
40 Regina v. Prince, [1875) 13 Cox. C.C. 138, 2 C.C.R. 154.
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But by far the most important disregard of the mens rea requirement exists in the sphere of regulatory penal law, which I
shall now discuss.
For a detailed historical introduction I must refer the reader
to Professor Sayre's various articles on the topic, frequently cited
in this essay. Suffice it here to say that regulatory penal law is a
newcomer in our system. 4 ' It was born with the industrial revolution, and developed side by side with the growing concern for
public welfare which was the concomitant of industrial progress.
It had independent beginnings in England and in this country.
The best 6vidence for the close relation between the industrial
revolution and the regulatory penal law is the fact that in this
country the earliest statutes and cases came from the New England
states, particularly Massachusetts, where the industrial revolution
took its start. The first statutes concerned the welfare of minors,
the regulation of tobacco, intoxicating liquor, gaming, and the
protection of the public against adulterated food, as well as the
protection of the purity of morals.
Public sentiment and political opinion had swung from the
primary protection of the individual to the primary protection of
society, at the expense of individual freedom.
The courts' opinions reflect not only the changing social
attitudes, but also the philosophico-legal currents. At the height
of naturalism, in 1789, Lord Kenyon, C.J., exclaimed: "It is a principle of natural justice, and of our law, that actus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea." 42 Let us change 1789 to 1879, and see what
the opinion is: ". . . the dictates of natural justice, such as that a
guilty mind is an essential element of crime, cannot be the ground
of decision . . . ." And the court which so spoke then weighed
the problem before it between "the injustice of punishing unconscious violations of law, and... the necessity, in view of public
utility, of punishing, at times, some of that very class of offenses,"
43
and it chose the latter.
A misunderstood 19th century utilitarianism had replaced the
18th century naturalism. Courts became obsessed by the idea that
the rapid breakdown of morals-or so they thought-could not be
halted except by being severe with offenders, for the ultimate gain
of society. Severity was thought to be identical with deterrence.
But what avenue had they chosen? Absolute criminal liabilityl
4' A brief historical account is also given in Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v.
State, 243 P.2d 369 (OkIa. Crim. 1952).
42 Fowler v. Padget, 7 T.R. 509 (1798).
43 Halstead v. State, 41 N.J.L. 552, 592, 32 Am. Rep. 247 (1879).
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The only form of sanction which is totally ineffective as a deterrent,
as will be more clearly shown below.
There were, and are, two distinct modes of making an offense
one of absolute liability. One way is to dispense with the requirement of an intent, so it is said. What really is meant is that the
44
requirement of an evil intent, a mens rea, is dispensed with.
Under this mode of proceeding the court will generally refuse to
consider any issue raised to show defendant's lack of evil intent. 5
The second way is to say that mens rea, or intent, (I) is necessary,
and that mens rea is the intent to do that which in fact amounts
to a violation of the law. 48 This intent may well have nothing
to do with what to the common law is known as mens rea. Courts
applying this rule confuse mens rea with mere mental self-direction,
or mere mens.47 The early West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
followed the former approach, as I shall now demonstrate.
The West Virginia history of criminal liability without fault
began in the field of liquor regulation, a field where the fanaticism
of abstainers has wrought at least as much damage as the follies
of drunkards. A statute forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors
to minors, except upon parental order. 41 John Caine sold intoxicating liquor to Michael Toole who turned out to be a minor,
although he had represented himself as an adult, and as one
holding voting rights. In affirming the decree of the trial court,
convicting Caine, the supreme court ruled
"that the seller may, sometimes, be deceived in information
and judgment as to the age of a customer, as to his being a
minor or not, is one of the perils he runs .... Whether [he]
...
knew, at the time he made sale thereof, that the person
to whom the sale is made is a minor or not, is immaterial
under the law."49
After discussing a number of out-of-state cases in accord, the
court then concluded:
"If the legislature had intended that the seller of intoxicating
drinks, whether licensed, or not, should only be subject to
prosecution when he made sale to a minor, knowing him to
be a minor, they would surely so have said in the law. But
4"State v. Buttery, 95 Ohio App. 236, 118 N.E.2d 548 (1953), as limited by
City of Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954). See
discussion of the point in State v. Schulte, 224 Iowa 599, 50 N.W.2d 9 (1951).
45 E.g., Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. State, supra n. 41.
46 E.g., City of Newark v. Charlton Holding Co., 9 N. J. Super. 433, 74 A.2d
641 (1950); and see State v. Long, 5 Terry 251, 59 A.2d 545 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1948), rev'd, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. S. Ct. 1949).
47 See ROBINSON, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROcEDu
424 (1949).
48 W. VA. CODE c.
12 (1868), and W. Va. Acts 1872-3 c. 99, §

32, §

49 State v. Cain, 9 W. Va. 559, 571 (1876).
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they have not said so, . . . and if they had so said, the law
would manifestly have failed in a great degree to accomplish
its manifest object."'' 0
Thus, the court joined the movement of overthrowing a few
milleniums of human tradition, and of centuries of the common
law, and made a crime that which the utmost care and bona ides
could not have prevented. What caused the court thus to deviate
from the common law? Undoubtedly, the menbers of the court
were familiar with Mr. Bishop's Commentaries on the Law of
Statutory Crimes, then only three years off the press.' " Bishop had
stated the principle of statutory construction on the question of
mens rea in these words:
"[Tlhe common law is not to be understood as having been
displaced by a statute, unless the statute displacing it is, in its
express words or necessary effect, plain and unequivocal. Within this proposition is embraced the minor one that, where
a statute is drawn in general terms, no act within these terms
is to be punished unless it proceeded
from what the common
52
law regards as a criminal mind."
Our court, therefore, should have held that since the statute
on which the Caine prosecution was based was silent on the mens
rea, it should be construed to require the usual criminal or evil
intent, traditionally subject to the defense of an honest mistake
of fact. Moreover, such a holding, it seems to me, was almost
mandatory, since the court could not point to a single West
Virginia or Virginia authority which would have warranted any
other holding.
The court was quite aware of its trespass and sought to defend
its holding. It reasoned that since the legislature had proclaimed
the statute to be a "remedial" one, rather than penal,5" a liberal
construction-not in the favor of the defendant-was warranted. 4
It is quite true that remedial statutes ought to receive a liberal
construction for the effectuation of the legislative purpose, and
such was the rule then.5 5 But what were remedial statutes? Bishop
lists as examples "those extending the right of appeal; allowing
redemption of real estate after a tax sale; providing for the settlement of disputes by arbitration . . .", and others. 0 In a later
section Bishop continued:
sold. at 576.
51 Boston (1873).
52 BISHOP,

COMMENTARIFS

ON

THEf

LAW

OF

footnotes omitted.
53 W. VA. CODE c. 32, § 40 (1868).
5- State v. Cain, supra n. 49, at 576.
5 BISHOP, op. cit. supra n. 52, §§ 120, 121.
56 Id. §

120.

STATUTORY

CRIMES

233 (1873),

Footnotes omitted.
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"There are things which the law esteems odious; not indeed
as being unnecessary, but odious in the sense in which a father
feels it odious to inflict needful chastisement on a child; and,
on the other hand, there are things in which the law delights.
In respect to things odious, we are to employ a strict interpretation; and, in respect to things favored, a liberal one: as a
father, in chastising his child, would keep within the necessity
of the case to the letter; while, in bestowing a merited reward,
he should cast in something also from affection. The law, for
example, loves harmony and right; therefore it construes
remedial statutes, made to amend some defects in the common
law, liberally: it loves honesty and fair-dealing, and construes
liberally statutes made to suppress frauds between individuals;
and, generally, it employs a liberal interpretation for statutes
which operate beneficially upon those whom they immediately
concern. But enactments of the opposite character, taking
away rights, or working forfeitures,
or creating hardships of
any kind, it construes strictly."57
Now then, was the West Virginia statute in question one that
operated beneficially upon those whom it immediately concernednamely liquor dealers-, or was it of a nature which took away
58
rights, worked forfeitures, or created hardships of any kind?
It seems beyond doubt that the court went way too far in
its application of the legislative mandate that the statute be a
remedial one. A number of more reasonable courses would have
been open: (a) The court could have ruled that liberal construction of a "remedial" statute does not go as far as to dispense with
the traditional mens rea requirement, particularly so since the
legislature had not said so in expressis verbis. (b) The court could
have ruled that since the statute was decreed to be a remedial one,
particular pains should be taken that the legislative purpose-thc
protection of minors from intoxicants-should be given effect.
Therefore, special insistence on mens rea should be made, as
tavern keepers, once punished for an honest mistake, would reason
that since no amount of care can protect them, they might as well
disregard the statute entirely. (c) The court could have denied
to the legislature the right and power to declare white that which
is black, remedial that which is penal.
Noticing that neither a doctrine nor cases of our jurisdiction
supported the stand of the court, what did it have to rely on?
There were a number of New England cases, particularly from
Massachusetts, which seemed rather persuasive. All of these seemed
5

1d.

§ 192. Footnotes omitted.
32 of W. VA. CoDo 1868 deals almost exclusiyely with

58 The entire chapter

penalties and forfeitures.
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to stand for the proposition that in this type of legislation-whatever the type embraced-a legislative silence on mens rea is tantamount to criminal liability for the mere causation of the prohibited
act, no matter how much care had been taken to stay on the path
of the law. Two adulterated milk cases from Massachusetts so
held. 59 But in a later milk case the Massachusetts court expressed
the belief that these cases went on the theory of "criminal carelessness" rather than absolute liability.6 0 But in State v. Cain the
West Virginia court, although citing all three milk cases, paid no
attention to this advice.
The "adulterated milk rule" had its predecessor in the "adulterated marriage rule". The first case to arise merely held that the
prosecution in an adultery case need neither allege nor prove that
the defendant bachelor knew his paramour to be married. The
judges thought this to be a "matter of defence, to be averred and
proved on his part."6' 1 But the judges in the Cain case seem to
have missed that part of the opinion, or perhaps merely relied on
Greenleafs citation of the case for a proposition which it does not
uphold.62 But the next "adulterated marriage" case to arise in
Massachusetts went considerably further. In Commonwealth v.
Mash the Massachusetts court sustained the conviction of an honorable lady for bigamy.6 :* It appears that her husband had fraudulently induced her to believe that he had died. The putative widow
took the veil again within less than seven years, thus violating the
statute. According to Mr. Bishop the case had been presented
in a "muddled way". Nevertheless, the case now stands for the
proposition that bona fide and honest belief do not constitute
defenses to conduct which the court deems to be absolutely forbidden on account of legislative silence on mens rea.
Next there were some cases for the protection of infants. The
first infant to be protected by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was an infant pig which ought not to have been butchered
belowv the age of four weeks. Mr. Raymond did not know of the
pig's minority and was, therefore, convicted.6 4 In two states further
59 Keeping for sale, or selling, adulterated milk, not knowing it to be
adulterated. Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489 (Mass. 1864); Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen 264 (Mass. 1865).
60 See Commonwealth v. Smith, 103 Mass. 444 (1869). This case itself was
decided under a more recent statute, expressly requiring knowledge of the
adulteration, and providing for higher penalties.
61 Commonwealth v. Ewell, 2 Metc. 190, 192, 35 Am. Dec. 398 (Mass. 1840).

v. Cain, supra n. 49, at 572.
Commonwealth v. Mash, 7 Metc. 472 (Mass. 1844), in State v. Cain er-

62 State
63

roneously called Commonwealth v. Marsh.
64 Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 587 (1867).
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west the infants were human and ought not to have obtained intoxicating liquor from the defendant sellers, unless upon written
order of the infants' parents. Honest mistake as to age was held
to be no defense.65
Quite in line with these decisions was Barnes v. State which
furthered the protection of drunkards, or so it was believed, by holding that to be criminally liable, the defendant liquor seller need not
have known the purchaser to be in the habit of becoming intoxicated. 6 In other words, the statute prohibiting sales of intoxicating
liquor to persons in the habit of becoming intoxicated was held
to impose liability upon anybody making such a sale, honest mistake
or not.
Lastly, our court relied on Commonwealth v. Boynton.67 This
case stands for the proposition that sale of intoxicating liquor is
unlawful even if the seller was unaware of its intoxicating quality,
thus imposing liability without mens rea. 8
Based on this array of authority the West Virginia court planted
the seed of absolute criminal liability in the fertile field of our
jurisprudence. It is obvious that our judges must have had a good
reason for imposing such an anomalous liability with no support
save doubtful authority. The judges did not leave us in doubt
about their good intentions: If the legislature had made mens rea
a part of the offense, "the law would manifestly have failed in a
great degree to accomplish its manifest object."8 6 And further:
"The object of the act, as prescribed in the title thereto, 0
manifestly cannot be accomplished, except by construing [the
offense to be one of absolute liability]. It is clear that without
such construction, the said section, in relation to minors,
71 would
almost, if not quite, be inoperative and of no effect."
To us today, without further guidance, neither the object nor
the threatened failure of the object are manifest. But it is probably
reasonable to assume that the court feared law enforcement with
65 State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 69 (1879), in State v. Cain erroneously cited as
State v. Hartell, 24 Wis. 80. Ulrich v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush. 400 (Ky. 1869),
in State v. Cain erroneously called Ulrich v. Carpenter. Both cases surprise
because of their lack-of citation of precedent.
0 19 Conn. 398 (1849).
87 Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2 Allen 160 (Mass. 1861).
s8 It is rather noteworthy that the majority of the judges of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, twelve years later, thought that mistake
of fact as to the intoxicating nature might be a defense. See State v. Denoon,
31 W. Va. 122, 125, 5 S.E. 315 (1888).
69 State v. Cain, supra n. 49, at 576.
70 "An Act Concerning Licenses." I can see no connection between the
title 7of the act and its object, whatever it may be,
State v. Cain, supra n. 49, at 577.
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regard to liquor might bog down unless the law itself had teeth.
Now then, how can a law deter anybody which inflicts punishment
for the mere doing of the outward act? Is it not manifest that a
law which punishes without caring about the factual and moral
blamelessness of a defendant thereby frustrates him and the community at large? Why should the citizen bother to use care if the
courts do not bother whether or not he used care, inflicting punishment in any event? Punishment which befalls the innocent and the
guilty alike, like hay fever, hail or hurricane, can have no good
effect at all, except perhaps for insurance companies, for whom it
creates a new insurable interest.
However unfortunate, absolute criminal liability was there
and, like every noxious weed, grew in abundance, elsewhere even
more than in West Virginia. State v. Cain set the pattern for a
whole string of cases, most of which propounded the Cain rule
without further discussion.7 2 State v. Denoon extended the rule of
direct criminal liability without fault to one that operated even
vicariously, 3 in accordance with the statute which forbade unlawful
sales of intoxicating liquor by agent as well.7 4 This form of
liability is even more incongruous. Not only does the defendant
in such cases lack a criminal intent, he even lacks the criminal act
or omission. State v.Denoon set the pattern for State v. Nichols.75
Here the principal was shown to have expressly forbidden his
agent to make sales of liquor to minors, and had cautioned him to
make careful inquiries before every sale. The facts of the case
make it clear that defendant agent was culpably negligent in not
ascertaining the facts before making the sale complained of. He
was rightfully convicted, but convicted also was the innocent principal. The court's reasoning in this case is rather revealing:
If the defendant principal "were permitted to defend an indictment for unlawful selling, on the ground that his bartender
has violated his instructions, the result would be that a conviction [of the principal] in many such cases could not be had,
and the statute, in a arge measure, would be defeated.
And what, one may ask, would be so catastrophic about not
convicting the principal who has done all he can do to honor the
law, while merely convicting the culprit who actually breached the
72 State v. Gilmore, 9 W. Va. 641 (1876); State v. Baer, 57 W. Va. 1, 16 S.E.
368 (1892) (liquor sales to minors); State v. Farr, 34 W. Va. 84, 11 SE. 737 (1890)
(liquor sale to person in the habit of drinking to intoxication).
73 31 W. Va. 122, 5 S.E. 315 (1888).
74 W. Va. Acts 1877, c. 107, § 13.
7567 W. Va. 659, 69 S.E. 304, 33 L.R.A. (Ns.) 419 (1910).

76Id. at 661.
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law when, by the exercise of greater care, he could have avoided
the breach? The court goes on:
"Such a defense is of a kind that is easy to manufacture to suit
the emergency, yet difficult to overthrow, and many unscrupulous persons would not hesitate to fabricate
such facts as would
be needful to accomplish their defense." 77
The ease of manufacturing surreptitious or fraudulent defenses is, as any lawyer knows; not confined to cases such as the one
before the court in State v. Nichols. Since the temptation to fabricate defenses is even greater in prosecutions in which the stakes
are higher, for instance in murder prosecutions, why then not
dispense with mens rea altogether and make every act, e.g., the
killing of a human being, conclusive evidence of a criminal intent
to do the act, e.g., killing a human being conclusive evidence of
a criminal intent, thus murder?
It should be noted that none of the statutes on which the ab6ve
cases were decided contained an express legislative dispensation
with the mens rea requirement. There was mere legislative silence,
judicially interpreted as a legislative intention to abrogate the principle of the common law.78 The constitutionality of such an abrogation was tested in State v. Woodward.7
The defendant was
charged with having kept his saloon open on a Sunday, in violati6n
of statute. There was no evidence that liquor had been sold, or
that other harm had resulted. The defendant's conviction was upheld, and the attack on the constitutionality of the dispensation
with the common law mens rea requirement was dismissed. The
legislature, so the court said, has an unlimited power to create
offenses at pleasure, as long as due process is not violated, and such
was ruled not to have been the case here. Nor was the punishment
found to be cruel and unusualsO
Perhaps I have stayed unduly long with the liquor cases. The
substantive law of these cases has long become obsolete. The
shifting of all liquor sales to the State Liquor Control Board has
acted as deus ex machina and removed absolute criminal liability
from this class of offenses by simply removing these offenses. But
77 Ibid.
78 To the

best of my knowledge no West Virginia statute ever contained an
express abrogation.
79 68 W.
Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385, 30 L.RA. (NS.) 1004 (1910).
80 The case raised an interesting side issue. Would necessity be a defense?

The court rightfully refused to answer the question in the instant .case. Since
no such defense has been interposed in any absolute liability case in this state,
the issue remained unresolved. Today the question is virtually moot under
West Virginia law, and in other states there is a split of opinion.
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liquor was the first nourishment for absolute criminal liability in
West Virginia, therefore the emphasis.
It is a remarkable fact that while in other states the doctrine
spread rapidly into the entire body of regulatory offenses, in West
Virginia the growth of the noxious weed, called absolute criminal
liability, was hardly noticeable for many decades. Not even noxious
weeds, it seems, will grow when sprinkled with liquor. The liquor
cases, particularly State v. Cain, to be quite sure, were still being
cited, but now with caution. In the field of sex crimes, where
the judges in many other states were particularly eager to apply
absolute criminal liability, our court proceeded with particular
caution. State v. Pennington was an incest prosecution.,,
The
indictment failed -to allege that the defendant was aware of the
kinship tie with his lady love. The court found that such an
allegation was not necessary, since the statute did not make the
absence of such knowledge a requirement. The court then cited
a Connecticut case which stands for the proposition that ignorance
8 2
"It
of relationship is no defense to an indictment for incest.
must be allowed to doubt so much of the opinion as holds that
knowledge of the relationship by the accused is not necessary,"
said Judge Brannon for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.8 3 This, then was the first spell of doubt cast upon the
wholesomeness of the doctrine of absolute criminal liability in
West Virginia.
If liquor was the first nourishment for the weed, liquor must
also be credited with having been one of its principal antidotes.
Truly, the legislature, nolens volens, had helped a little. In State
v. Smith, the court was confronted with a statute which, inter alia,
attempted to punish an agent who delivered an out-of-state shipment of intoxicating liquor to any person within this state, "except
to a person having a State license to sell the same, or to the bona
fide consignee thereof." 4 Blake, the addressee of a box marked
"Glass", had neither a license to sell, nor was he a bona fide consignee within the definition of the statute. But when asked by
Smith before the delivery of the box (in fact containing liquor),
Blake pretended to be a bona fide consignee and signed an affidavit
to this effect. Under the Cain rule the court ought to have sustained
8 41 W. Va. 599, 23 S.E. 918 (1896).

82 State v. Dana,'59 Vt. 623, 10 At. 727 (1887).
83 But is it not frustrating to note that more recently our court well nigh
reversed itself in the sex crime field? See discussion of State v. Taylor, nn. 115123, 8infra.
4 State v. Smith, 61 W. Va. 329, 330, 56 S.E. 528 (1907).
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Smith's conviction. But the judges did not follow Cain. Approving
Mr. Bishop's position, the court found the words "bona fide" to be
the proper straw to cling to. By using such words, so the court
argued, the legislature really had not been silent on the matter
of mens rea. Hence, honest mistake of fact on the part of Smith
could be used as an excuse. The argument of the court is well
composed, though a little roundabout-which was, of course,
necessary. The result must be hailed:
"Smith acted honestly and in good faith. If such agent delivers a box or package containing liquor, but not disclosing
the character of its contents, does the statute mean that he
is guilty, though he may not have known the contents? Must
the agent investigate every box? How? He cannot break
the box. If he makes fair investigation, and has reasonable
ground to believe the box does not contain liquor, is he nevertheless guilty? Is that the real meaning of the statute? This
doctrine may, in many cases, defeat the design of the statute;
still, we must not give the act a construction to promote injustice, and inflict punishment on the innocent agent."' 5
This argument, of course, is not really confined to Mr. Smith
and the box marked "Glass". It is a beautiful summary of the
whole argument against the use of absolute crimipal liability.
It was only eight years later that the West Virginia court
dealt another severe blow against the friends of absolute criminal
liability. Again, liquor was the battle ground. A statute had attempted to make the possession of intoxicating liquor conclusive
evidence of "unlawful keeping, storing and selling." While the
court's opinion is not clothed in terms of mens rea, the decision is
clear enough: "Under such circumstances," the court said, "a person
might be convicted without due process of law. It has been truly
said, that 'closing the mouth of a person when he comes into court
has the same effect as depriving him of his day in court to vindicate
his rights.' "80 Since this decision the West Virginia legislature has
made no further attempts to dispense with a mens rea by the legislative creation of an irrebuttable presumption of partial or entire
guilt; and neither before nor after this decision has any West Virginia statute attempted to abrogate the mens rea requirement expressly, from all that appears.
The moonshine era provided further antidotes, and our judges
gave proof of their alertness. Proper results were reached although
the statutes said little more about the mens rea requirement than
8sId. at 333.
8o State v. Sixo, 77 W. Va. 243, 87 S.E. 267 (1915).
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did the statute in State v. Smith. The possession of a moonshine
still, by itself, it was held, is not unlawful. There must be an
unlawful intent, namely the intent to use the still in violation of
the law.8 7 And so with the possession of mash, and even the
possession, or transportation, of contraband liquor itself. 88
Unfortunately, during this era of growing enlightenment a
few cases were decided that are almost worthy State v. Cain. State
v. Furrand State v: Lorentz, 9 consolidated for decision, upheld the
convictions of pool room managers for permitting minors to play
pool, in violation of a statute which was silent on intent. Ignorance
and good faith were held to be beyond judicial recognition.
State v. Harris,an outrageous prosecution for contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, upheld the conviction of the boy friend
of a fifteen year old girl, whp frequently dated her, sometimes
keeping her out late, against her father's wishes (which may, or
may not, have been known to the defendant). The girl, so it
seems, did not become delinquent. But that was not necessary
under the statute. The boy had no intention to contribute to his
girl friend's delinquency. But that was not necessary under the
statute either.90
State v. Masters,91 construing the West Virgiina hit-and-run
statute,92 came close to the imposition of absolute liability with this
language:
"The statute in the instant case does not make knowledge of
the accident a part of the offense, and, under the general rule,
it is not necessary for the State to so allege. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the very object of the statute .... In
most cases it would be impossible for the State to prove scienter
beyond a reasonable doubt, while the accident itself might
properly be proven." 93
The first thing that comes to the reader's mind is the question:
Is it not clear that a crime which the state cannot prove cannot
87 State v. Edgell, 94 W. Va. 198, 118 S.F. 144 (1923); State v. Moore, 95
W. Va. 604, 122 S.E. 147 (1924); State v. Bermiawitz, 98 W. Va. 637, 127 S.E.
494 (1925); State v. Haller, 112 W. Va. 4, 163 S.X 635 (1932)
88 State v. McHenry, 93 W. Va. 396, 117 S.E. 143 (1923); State v. Cirrillo,
96 W. Va. 25a, 122 S.Y. 655 (1925); in a prosecution for the possession of mash
it must be established that there was an intent to use it for the purpose of
illegally making intoxicating liquor. State v. Lough, 97 W. Va. 241, 124 S.E. 608
(1924); State v. Lambert, 100 W. Va. 377, 130 S.F. 520 (1925); State v. Lee, 103
W. Va. 631, 138 S.E. 323 (1927); State v. Sprague, 111 W. Va. 32, 161 S.E. 24
(1931); on possession or transportation of liquor.
89 101 W. Va. 178, 132 S.X. 504 (1926).
90 105 W. Va. 165, 141 S.E. 637 (1928).
9' 106 W. Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928).

92 IV. VA. CODE c. 46, § 97 (Barnes 1923).
93 State v. Masters, n. 91, supra, at 48-49.
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lead to the conviction of anybody? That has been so since time
immemorial, and there is nothing wrong with this rule. Truly, it
is difficult to prove scienter beyond a reasonable doubt in a hitand-run case. But would it not suffice to relax the rule just a
little, so as to permit the state to prove a prima facie scienter, and
leave the rebuttal up to the defendant, rather than to overthrow a
salutary rule of law entirely? The state, for instance, could be
permitted to prove than on a clear day (no thunder or rain) the
defendant drove in a 45 mph. zone and sideswiped a parked car.
It could also prove that the impact of hollow metal on hollow metal
at the thrust of 45 mph. creates a noise of about 80 decibels (or
whatever the amount may be) above the minimum level of human
audibility. Then the state should be permitted to rest its case on the
question of scienter and, unless the defendant can rebut the presumption of knowledge arising from the proof of these facts, it is entitled
to a conviction. The defendant, in rebuttal, may prove that the car
travelled at a speed of only 10 mph., or that he is hard of hearing
and cannot perceive sounds of 80 decibels above minimum human
audibility. He may prove that the impact of the sideswiping was
slight and did not create the alleged amount of decibels. He may
prove that while the impact occurred, an express train was passing
on the tracks alongside the road, making it impossible to hear
sounds, etc. But why should any chance be taken from the defendant to prove his innocence? If xebuttal is not permissible,
unjust convictions may result, however remote the possibility may
be. Read with pink glasses. with the reader's fingers crossed, and
with much confidence in the future, the language of the court in
State v. Masters may perhaps be so narrowly construed as to still
leave it up to the defendant in future cases to rebut the presumption of mens rea, arising without any proof of scienter.
The cases arising under the narcotic drug act found a reasonable disposition by the court, similar to that accorded the moonshine cases. 94 The typical offense charged under the act is that
of possession with intent to sell. This unlawful intent need not
be alleged in the indictment. Nevertheless, so both West Virginia
cases in point make clear, the intent is material.9'
Another area in which the West Virginia court refused to disregard the defendant's mens rea is that of the unlawful possession
94 W. Va. Acts 1911, c. 16, § 2, now Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, W. Va. Acts
1935, c. 46.
95 State v. Sutter, 71 V. Va. 371, 76 S.E. 811, 43 A.L.R. (N.s.) 399 (1912);
State v. Hinkle, 129 W. Va. 393, 41 S.E.2d 107 (1946). For further discussion of
these cases cee n. 131, infra.
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of weapons. In State v. Underwood the court declared that the
casual examiner cannot be held guilty under a statute making it
criminal to possess weapons without license, except in the possessor's own home.9 The statute was absolutely silent on mens rea!
Similarly, in State v. Cline the court found that it had properly
been left to the jury to determine whether the defendant, charged
with the unlawful possession of a weapon, had acquired the weapon
lawfully during the performance of his duties as a justice of the
peace, and was properly carrying the weapon to a safe place. " ,
The most famous of the West Virginia cases in this area of
criminal law is State v. The Great Altantic & Pacific Tea Company
of America,"8 with its just as masterly as brief opinion by
Judge Hatcher, written for a unanimous court. Defendant company was indicted for a short weight sale by one of its agents,
contrary to the weights and measures statute.99 While the statute
used the word "knowingly" in some of the violations it lists, there
is silence on mens rea with respect to short weight sales. I quote
from the opinion:
"It is too elementary to call for citation of authority that
under the common law it has been the general rule for centuries that there can be no crime without criminal intent
[mens rea]. (Such intent is of course the offspring of knowledge express or implied.) It is contended by the state, however,
that the legislature has the power to eliminate the element of
intent from statutory crimes. Even so, that purpose should
be so clearly expressed as to leave no room for doubt ....
Where a merchant employs a large number of salesmen, as
does the defendant, it is physically impossible for him to
supervise personally every sale. Consequently, the construction of the statute sought by the state would make criminal
an act which the utmost good faith and care of the merchant
could not prevent. Such a departure from the common law,
so violative of traditional conceptions of justice and so unfair
to honorable merchants, is not to be inferred from the mere
placement of a semi-colon, as contended by the state."'20
There was no mention of State v. Cain with all its ugly shoots.
The test created by the A. &P. case was a new one: Criminal liability, to be absolute, needs a "clearly expressed" legislative intention.
98 89 W. Va. 548, 109 S.E. 609 (1921).
125 W. Va. 63, 22 S.E.2d 871 (1942).
98 111 W. Va. 148, 161 S.E. 5
(1931), hereinafter in the text called the
A. & P. case. "
99 AV. VA. CODE C. 59, § 29 (Barnes 1923).
100 State v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. of America, supra n. 98, at
149-50. Emphasis mine. For a contrary view see Horack, In the Name of
Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 118, 124 (1932).
-97
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Let us remember this and mark it down as the West Virginia Rule.
It is necessary today to note such matter. In far too many American
states the rule seems to fall below this minimum requirement of
justice.
Everything would be well with our West Virginia Rule, were
it not for two later cases which leave me with a somewhat uneasy
feeling. There is first the famed C. &cP. Telephone case.10' The
telephone company was indicted for having unlawfully furnished
horse racing messages over its wires to a poolroom, contrary to
statute. In affirming an order of the district court which overruled
the demurrer, Judge Kenna wrote in the majority opinion:
"Whether the indictment is demurrable because it does not
allege that the offense was 'knowingly' committed, we think,
should be considered in the light of the fact that this offense is
malum prohibitum, not malum in se. The statute in question
does not require that the act prohibited should be knowingly
done. We do not see why this question is to be distinguished
from the question which was raised in the cases involving the
sale of intoxicating liquors to minors. The statute under
consideration in those cases did not require knowledge, and
this Court held that for that reason the indictments need not
allege that the offense was knowingly committed. State v.
Smith, 61 W. Va. 329, 562 S.E. 528; State v. Furr, 101 W. Va.
178, 132 S.E. 504."102

State v. Smith and State v. Furr had long been discredited by
a unanimous court in the A. & P. case. It is not at all clear why
Judge Kenna totally ignored that later case. Fortunately, though,
that part of the opinion which interests us here is not the law in
West Virginia. Judge Kenna's ruling was carried by a majority
on other grounds. On the point in question Fox, President, and
Hatcher, Judge, dissented. The state, President Fox pointed out,
had gone as far as to concede that "lack of knowledge would be a
defense to the charge. ' '0 .
"The majority opinion does not follow the concession of the
state, and would consider lack of knowledge only in mitigation of punishment, but in my opinion, the failure to show

101 State v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 121 W. Va. 420, 4 S.E. 257
(1932), hereinafter in the text called the C. & P. Telephone case. A well written
comment on the case may be found at 46 W. VA. L.Q. 175 (1940). The commentator, unfortunately, falls into some common traps.
102 State v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., supra n. 101, at 424.
103 Id. at 426.
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knowledge on10 the
part of the state would entitle it to a verdict
4
of acquittal."
Judge Riley specially concurred in the majority opinion, but
was likewise of the opinion "that lack of knowledge and reasonable
grounds of knowledge that defendant's wires were being used in
violation of the statute is a good defense."'' 0- Thus, on the question of absolute criminal liability the majority opinion is the
minority opinion.
Two factors in this opinion deserve particular discussion. Judge
Kenna based his ruling on the distinction between mala in se and
mala prohibita, implying that the common law mens rea requirement applied to the former, but not to the latter. The supposed
distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita is older than
absolute criminal liability. Clark and Marshall 0 0 point out in
their treatise that this distinction
"is frequently unfounded, and even as early as 1822 an English
Judge said that the distinction had long since exploded107
Presently it seems to get its greatest use by misinformed or
lethargic courts who insert it as a prop to rationalize preconceived results' 08 "
Kenny criticised the distinction between mala in se and mala
prohibita with the words: "This defective classification of crimes
clearly formed an unsound premise from which to draw any jurisprudential conclusions .. . .09
All writers agree that this supposed distinction is one between things not inherently alien. The
line of demarcation is vague and fluctuating, from day to day, and
from county to county. Truly, among the members of a given
community at a given time some offences are regarded as grave,
others as slight., A reliable guide, however, can be established only
by the action of the community as a whole, namely through legislative fiat. We have such fiats on the distinction between crimes
and misdemeanors. We have none on the distinction between
104 President Fox argued particularly that otherwise an impossible burden
would be cast upon the Telephone company. "Being under [a statutory] requirement of service, I cannot believe it was intended to make its compliance
therewith a crime, unless done with knowledge that an unlawful act was
thereby aided." Ibid.
105

Id. at 424.

106 C AM

& MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 13

(5th ed.,

Kearney
1952).
107X15)

10,,"Best, J., in Bensley v. Bignold, 5 Barn. & Aid. 335." Kearney's footnote.

"See the following note, The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and

Mala in Se in Criminal Law, S0 COL. L.R. 74, which criticizes the distinction."
Kearney's footnote. This student note contains an excellent collection of
authorities.
109 TURNER KENNY'S OuTLuNES OF CRIMINAL

LAw § 17 (1952).
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mala in se and mala prohibita. The personal opinions as to the
latter distinction, voiced by even the most informed, are so utterly
unreliable as to furnish no guide, vide Coke and Blackstone."10
Therefore, it is indefensible to use so vague a distinction as a
criterion for the dispensation with one of the pillars of our common
law justice, the mens rea requirement, as Judge Kenna attempted
to do.'
The second point in Judge Kenna's opinion deserving special
mention is his dictum to the effect that "[t]he lack of knowledge,
it is to be assumed, would be considered by the trial court in mitiI have noted before that three
gation of punishment . . . ."12
judges voiced their disagreement. All other arguments in favor
of absolute criminal liability failing, it has sometimes been reasoned
that the raising of issues in defense of regulatory violations would
require dealing with collateral and irrelevant issues. Hence, too
much time, in proportion to the slightness of the offense, would have
to be devoted to the matter if the defendant were permitted to present an elaborate defense, or, indeed, any defense. It has been said
that courts would never be able to clear their calendars if in this
vast mass of petty offenses a judge, or a jury, were to try all defensive
facts. Speediness of "justice" is said to be the compelling reason
for absolute criminal liability.""
If this were truly the only, or major, reason for resort to absolute criminal liability, then it would be sheer folly to dispense
with the mens rea and nevertheless to consider all defensive arguments for the purpose of possibly mitigating the punishment, as
Judge Kenna attempted to do. Of course, this only goes to show
that the "speediness of justice" argument is absurd. The choice
does not lie between speedy justice and slow justice, but between
speedy injustice and justice of whatever celerity we can achieve by
whatever court reform may be necessary. Justice ought to be
speedy, but absolute criminal liability is not apt to achieve it.
This brings me to a point which has been made by the commentator of the C. & P. Telephone case. After repeating an argument which I have already refuted in my discussion of the Cain
case-that the "manifest object" of the statute would have failed110 Id. at 22.

"I1E.g., Note, 46 W. VA. L.Q. 175 (1940), accepting this distinction without
hesitation. See Mr. Sayre's discussion on the impossibility of the distinction,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55, 70-71 (1933).
112 State v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of West Virginia, supra
n. 101, at 424.
113 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoL. L. REv. 55, 69-70 (1933).
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the writer says: "As the penalty is slight, no great injustice is per114
petrated by enforcing this type of statute regardless of knowledge."
Are we compelled to prefer small injustice over justice? I do not
think that the writer regarded this point as a major reason for the
imposition of absolute criminal liability. But even as collateral
support it fails miserably. Such reasoning may be appropriate in
a country where absolutism and dictatorial utility sacrifice life,
liberty and property to the Moloch state, but not here.
Fortunately, as mentioned before, on the question of absolute
criminal liability, the majority opinion of the C. & P. Telephone
case stands without any binding power. But there is a second
recent case which rests like a cloud on the authority of the wholesome rule of the A. & P. case, although it does not amount to more
than a dictum. This is State v. Taylor.1" A statute threatens
punishment to "any person who shall receive . .. any person into
any house . . . for the purpose of prostitution.""'1 6 Tracy Taylor
was caught red-handed, so to speak, violating the statute. But she
contended that the indictment was bad because it merely charged
that the acts were done unlawfully, and the word unlawfully "can
not take the place of a statement that they were done knowingly or
with knowledge.""* 7 Judge Haymond properly found: "That argument is unsound." ' s But be went further and said: "When the
statute is silent, as here, concerning the knowledge of the defendant,
the indictment need not allege that [s]he possessed such knowledge.
State v. Furr, 101 W. Va. 178, 132 S.E. 504.""fl This is partially
right, partially wrong. Nobody will quarrel with the statement
that.whenever a statute is (absolutely) silent on inens rea, no IMncs
rea need be alleged in the indictment. Such is the well established
rule in this state, and it is not overly dangerous. Whether knowledge
is in fact an element of the offense or not is a different question.120
But so much of Judge Haymond's sentence as states that this statute
is silent on mens rea, is not authoritative. It is conceded that what
the statute demands, the state must allege and prove.'12 This
statute demands that the state allege and prove that the defendant
received any person into any house for the purpose of prostitution.
114 46 W. VA. L.Q. 175, 177 (1940).

115 130 Wv.Va. 74. 43 S.E.2d 549 (1947).
116 W. Va. Acts 1943, c 30, art. 8, § 5 (a). Emphasis mine.
117 State v. Taylor, n. 115, supra, at 82.
118 Ibid.
"19

Ibid.

220 Though it is not without bearing on the determination of the necessity
for knowledge as an element of the offense, as the cases discussed so far seem
to indicate.
121 With the exception of surplusage, which is certainly not involved here.
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Thus, if the state merely proves that the defendant admitted a
person, etc., into any house, the charge under the statute is not made
out, just as the statute would not be satisfied if the defendant received a person, etc., for the purpose of singing lessons or playing chess.
Hence, if the state, as it must, proves that the defendant received,
etc., for the purpose of prostitution, it proves an evil purpose on the
part of the defendant. That is the crux of mens rea. The statute,
therefore, is not at all silent on mens rea. In fact, the reported decision makes it abundantly clear that the state had in fact proved such
an evil design on the part of the defendant, without a shadow of
a doubt.
The decision is also out of line with the established rule of
construction of the court. The moonshine statutes were construed
precisely in the way which I have indicated as the proper one for
the prostitution statute. These required the possession of a moonshine still "for the purpose of distilling . . . intoxicating liquor.
. ."1
* 22- And this language had been held to be indicative of the
"
mens rea requirement in State v. Edgell.12
Judge Haymond's criticised language is dictum, and the actual
holding goes no further than to permit the state to leave mens rea
allegations out of the indictment when the statute is silent. So
much is sound law, and not in conflict with the A. & P. case. Since
the C. & P. Telephone case likewise did not affect the A. & P. case,
the latter is the law in West Virginia. We have some indication
that the court will adhere to this salutary decision. Most recently
the court was confronted with Code section 61-10-1 (keeping or
exhibiting gaming table or device), a statute which prior to the
A. & P. case would undoubtedly have been construed as imposing
absolute criminal liability. Today the court required an "evil
intention" on the part of the offender as one of the requisites "to
24
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'
I may be permitted to summarize as much of our law as is
25
necessary for the understanding of the main rule:
(1) Mens rea (criminal intent or negligence) is an esdemanded by the common law,
sential element of every crime,
2
and by common sense.1 1
32A, § 37 (Barnes 1923).
v. Edgell, 94 W. Va. 198, 118 S.E. 144 (1923). And see n. 86, supra.
124 State v. Calandros, 86 S.E.2d 242, 246 (W. Va. 1955). The issue was
whether or not defendant could be charged with knowledge of the fact that his
device was a gambling device and was used as such.
125 In this summary no attempt will be made to cite all West Virginia cases
for every proposition.
126 State v. Edgell, 94 W. Va. 198, 206, 207, 118 S.E. 144 (1923).
122 W. VA. ConE c.
123 State
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(2) Actus reus and mens rea (forbidden act and evil mind)
must concur to constitute the crime.' 2 (3) The legislature has becn given the power to dispense with
the requirement of mens rea in petty offenses of a regulatory
8
nature. Thus, it may impose absolute criminal liability.12
(4) But any legislative intention to dispense with the mens

rea requirement must be "clearly expressed." 121

(5) Particularly in the area of vicarious criminal liability
(such as that of a principal for the unlawful act of his agent)
the rule listed under (4), supra, must be heeded. The principal cannot be held criminally responsible for the act of his
agent, where the principal acted without blame.":01
(6) Whenever the statute contains no clearly expressed intention to dispense with mens rea, the common law rule will be
applied, and a general intent to do the prohibited act with
knowledge of all material facts-particularly those that mark
the border between the lawful and the unlawful conductwill be required.' 1'
It follows that if in our code there is no statute-and I believe
there is not-in which a legislative intention to abandon the common law rule by dispensing with the mens rea requirement is
"clearly expressed", then we have no absolute criminal liability
in West Virginia, as of this day and year. Older instances of absolute criminal liability antedate the new rule and are no longer
governing. It is a further fact that not only did the legislature
insert no express abrogation provision into any of the statutes
passed since the A. & P case was decided, but in many of the regulatory statutes it expressly inserted mens rea considerations. For
example, in a number of other states the offense of driving without
any of the required lights on an automobile is one of absolute
liability: :32 But the West Virginia legislature, by chapter 90 of
the Acts of 1939-rather than to make for a useless liability of the
violator despite care-provided that: The proper state personnel
may stop vehicles suspected to be improperly equipped. An inspection will follow. If the vehicle is found to be improperly equipped,
an order will be given to repair the vehicle, or to cure the defect,
127 Id. at 206.
128

State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 SE.385, 30 L.R.A. (Ns.) 1004 (1910).

129 State v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. of America, 111 W. Va.

148, 161 S.E. 5 (1931).
1.30 Ibid.
13' Ibid.; State v. Sprague, 111 W. Va. 132, 134, 162 S.E. 24 (1931).
:12
Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 1226; 8 BLASHFIE,
CYCLOPEDiA OF AUTroMBILE
LAw & PRAGcnTl§ 5370 (1950).
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within five days, and then to submit to renewed inspection. In
brief, while everybody is required to have his automobile properly
equipped with lights, punishment for violation will not be imposed
on the guilty and the innocent alike, but only on the stubborn
offender who fails to comply after warning. But this intelligent
way of dealing with the mens rea problem in regulatory penal law
antedates the A. & P. case. In fact, examination of the older
statutes leads to the conclusion that absolute criminal liability, if
intended at all, was the exception, and a rare one at that, rather
than the rule, some dicta in old cases notwithstanding. Thus, our
automobile light statute has long provided that in case of a bona
fide (I) failure of the lights, the operator may proceed to a safe
place of repair, observing special safety rules. Again, the statute
takes the frame of mind of the violator into consideration.
While liability imposed regardless of care fails to have any
deterrent effect upon either the offender or the community at large,
liability imposed only after failure to heed a warning certainly
singles out for punishment the truly guilty person while, in addition, having a general deterrent effect.
The use of the prior warning method is not restricted to drivers
without head- or tail light. The West Virginia worthless check act
employed the same method. The statute prohibited the issuing of
any check without sufficient funds to cover it. The command
seemed absolute. But to single out the evil-spirited offender 'for
punishment, the statute provided also that payment of the check
within twenty days after notice of protest will relieve the offender
3
of criminal liability.1 3
The law of West Virginia has employed various other methods
in preference to absolute criminal liability. There is primarily
the device of shifting the burden of proof. Mens tea, i.e., intent to
produce the unlawful state of affairs, will be presumed, until the
defendant who is proven to have brought about the state of affairs,
will have rebutted this presumption of his guilty mind. The
method has been used successfully in liquor legislation,134 as well

133 State v. Pishner, 72 W. Va. 603, 78 S.E. 752 (1913).
The act was later
amended, and now even requires proof of fraudulent intent. State v. McGinnis,
116 W. Va. 473, 181 S.E. 820 (1935).
134 E.g., sale of liquor by an unlicensed druggist raises a rebuttable presumption that the sale was unlawful. Miles v. State, 5 W. Va. 524 (1872); State
v. Bluefield Drug Co., 43 W. Va. 144, 27 S.E. 350 (1897); State v. Davis, 68 W. Va.
142, 69 S.E. 369, 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 501, A.A... 1912A 999 (1910). A criminal%
intent is rebuttably presumed from the act of carrying liquor in violation of
statute, State v. Boggs; 103 W. Va. 641, 645, 138 S.E. 321 (1927).
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as in narcotics legislation. 35
A further alternative of dealing with regulatory offenses is by
changing the liability from a criminal to a civil one. Frequently
the civil remedy is much more effective in deterring potential wrongdoers. At least in case where the harm is inflicted upon a determinable person, or persons, rather than the state as a whole, the
civil sanction is preferable. The former West Virginia civil damage
act provides us with an example. 13 0 State v. Farr,137 it will be
remembered, stands for the proposition that anybody who sells
intoxicating liquor to a person in the habit of becoming intoxicated
will be punished regardless of mens rea. In many states such is
still the law today. The remoteness of likelihood of penal consequences for every uninvestigated sale of an intoxicating drink, as
well as the practical impossibility to make an investigation before
every sale of a drink, cause sellers of drinks to disregard the law,
thereby making such a law practically ineffective. How much more
effective was the civil damage act by permitting a dependent of any
person injured on account of intoxication to recover damages from
the saloon keeper who permitted the injured person to drink to
intoxication? To prevent hardships to truly innocent saloon
keepers the statute required the plaintiff to prove defendant's knowledge that the injured person drank to intoxication, or was in
the habit of becoming intoxicated.'
Further investigation may
well lead to the conclusion that in many instances in which the
law imposes criminal liability today, a civil remedy will operate
much more effectively.
Furthermore, where today alsolute criminal liability is often
deemed the only solution to a grievance, a liability based on
negligence often will be more effective. For instance, suppose
the law would command a building association absolutely to loan
money only for the legitimate use for which the statute permits it
to charge a high interest rate which otherwise would be usurious.
135W. Va. Acts 1911, c. 16, § 2, made possession of cocain with intent to
sell a crime. The mere possession was prima fade evidence of intent to sell.
Unless rebutted, mere averment and proof of possession would lead to conviction. State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S.E. 811, 43 L.R.A. (N.s.) 399 (1912),
decided under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 40.
130 W. VA. CoDE c. 32, § 26 (1906), repealed with creation of the W. Va.
Liquor Control Board by W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 4.
137 34 W. Va. 84, 11 S.E. 737 (1890), supra n. 72.
13 Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 68 W. Va. 197, 69 S.E. 850 (1910); Greer v.
Arrington, 72 W. Va. 693, 79 S.E. 720 (1912). It is clear that where the
defendant can not be charged with that much scienter, no blame can attach,
and no liability ought to follow.
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If a borrower would then divert the money so loaned for another
use, the building association would'be guilty of usury, no matter
how much care it took to prevent misuse. But if negligence becomes the test, then the building association is criminally liable
only if it fails to use due diligence in ascertaining that the funds
are properly applied.1 29
The absolute law works toward frustration and apathy since
penalty does not depend on lack of exercise of care, the negligence
law works toward diligence, by excepting the honest and diligent
from punishment.
There are, it seems, a multitude of answers to the menace of
absolute criminal liability. In a case note in the West Virginia
Law Quarterly one writer pointed to the task which Equity could
perform in the fight against criminal social evils.14o Usury is one
of the fields where Equity can provide for a remedy better than
that of absolute criminal liability. Frequently such an extension will
need legislative help.141
This article does not claim to be an exhaustive survey of the
problem of absolute criminal liability. If it has ndicated the
general development and status of this evil, and stated the law as it
was and is in this state, it has accomplished its basic purpose. But
I had one other objective: There are but a few jurisdictions in th
common law world in which absolute criminal liability has been
rejected. West Virginia can be counted among these few states.
Elsewhere the use of absolute criminal liability is as superabundant
as ineffective of good results, or even harmful. But the argument
in favor of it is repeated again and again: absolute criminal
liability or breakdown of justice. This is a slogan without merit.
In having indicated alternative solutions which have been successfully applied in this state, and by now pointing to the fact that
West Virginians can not complain of a breakdown of their law enforcement, I hope to have shown to the advocates of absolute
criminal liability, how shaky their stand, how absurd their law,
and how unjust their justice are.
It is only fair to conclude this discussion with a summary list
of the rules in the various jurisdictions, as indicative of the position
of the West Virgina Rule.
There are at least nine official positions on the question of
absolute criminal liability:
139 Pfeister v. Wheeling Building Ass'n, 19 W. Va. 676, 715-720 (1882).
140
141

Note, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 65 (1932).
See CLARK, EQurrY 656-671 (1954).
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(1) A constitutional prohibition of all criminal liability
ex14 2
cept that based on personal conscious wrongdoing.
(2) A declaration of unconstitutionality, as violative of due
process, and as vague and uncertain, of any statute which
would "make an act, innocent in itself, a crime, and criminals
of those who might perchance fall within its interdiction,
* * * [and which tends] to embrace within its ambits the
guilty and the innocent alike, [because t]his43would afford no
reasonable ascertainable standard of guilt.1
(3) A judicial rule outlawing all criminal liability except that
based on personal conscious wrongdoing, thus absolutely requiring all statutes to be interpreted in the light of the principle of criminal law14that evil act and evil mind must concur
(common law rule).
(4) A mistake of fact statute:
"If a person laboring under a mistake of fact shall do
an act which would otherwise be criminal he is guilty
of no offense, but the mistake of fact which will excuse
must be such that the person so acting under a mistake would have been excusable had his conjecture as
to the fact been correct, and it must also be such
mistake as does not arise from a want4of proper care
on the part of the person so acting."' 5

142 Known only to the Constitution of the West German State of Hesse.
Art. 22, § 2 of the Hessian Constitution of 12 - 18 - 1946. Ges. & V.O.B1. 229, as
approved by the U.S. Military Government.
'43 State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 993, 995, 189 P2d 993 (1948). The West Virginia
case of State v. Sixo, supra n. 86, comes dose to reaching the same standard
as that of State v. Prince. Were it not for the fact that in the later decided A. & P.
case the court conceded to the legislature the power to dispense with the mens
rea requirement, State v. Sixo might have served as the basis for a later decision
outlawing all absolute criminal liability as violative of due process.
v. Elliot, 232 N.C. 377, 61 S.E.2d 93 (1950).
144 Existing under German law since the West German Federal Supreme
Court decision, by the Plenum of the Criminal Senate, of March 18, 1952.
GSSt. 2/51. 2 BGH St. 194, 5 N.J.W. 593, 7 J.Z. 335 (1952). The North Carolina
rule is similar. But there the mens rea is presumed for all regulatory offenses,
until the defendant rebuts the presumption, which he is at liberty to do in all
such prosecutions. E.g., State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E.2d 199 (1950); State
v. Elliott, 232 N.C. 377. 61 S.E.2d 93 (1950).
'45Art. 41 TEXAS PENAL CODE.
Hamiton v. State, 115 Tex. Cr. 96, 29
S.W.2d 777 (1930); but note that statutes which require no more than a union
of criminal act and criminal intent as to all crimes, and which were probably
passed for the same purpose as the Texas statute, have been interpreted to
require no more than an intent to do that which the law in fact prohibits,
regardless of mistakes of fact. Mental self-direction and criminal intent are
thus being confused. Balark v. State, 81 Ga. App. 649, 59 S.E.2d 524 (1950);
People v. Gory, 28 Cal.2d 450, 170 P.2d 433 (1946).
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(5) Case law to the effect that the necessity for mens rea will
be presumed for all crimes, unless a legislative intention contrary is "clearly expressed" (West Virginia Rule).'4"
(6) Case law to the effect that whether or not mens rea is
required for xegulatory offenses depends on statutory construction aimed at uncovering the legislative intention,without any fixed criteria for ascertaining these standards.
(The result of this rule, prevailing in most American jurisdictions, is a confused law, with inconsistent
decisions, and
4
the lowest possible state of legal certainty.)1 T
(7) Case law to the effect that the legislature has an absolute
discretion to dispense with the mens rea requirement in all
regulatory offenses, that such dispensation
will be presumed,
1 48
unless the contrary clearly appears.
(8) Case law to the effect that the legislature is presumed to
have dispensed with the mens rea reuirement in all statutory
crimes (which may embrace the entire body of criminal law)
whenever a statute is silent on mens rea, regardless
of the
49
nature of the crime, or the severity of punishment.
f(9) A "law" which attempts to punish anybody who is harmto the ruling power, for any act which the judges under a
catch-all provision deem detrimental to the ruling power,
whether the defendant meant to do the act or not, whether
the act was known to be offensive or not. 50

u

Were we to draw a line that would separate the sound law from
the unsound law, this line would lead through the middle of the
fifth category, with the West Virginia Rule being in the upper half.
146 E.g., State v. Great Atlantic 8&Pacific Tea Co. of America, 111 W. Va.
148, 161 S.E. 5 (1931). We could here further distinguish between: (A) states
in which after such a ruling the legislature has dearly expressed a wish to abolish
mens rea, e.g., England, at least theoretically. See W.LLAs, CRiMiNAL LAw § 70
(1953). (B) States in which the legislatures have not so acted. Thus far West
Virginia seems to stand alone with its salutary rule.
1-47 This is the typical way of stating the rule, and is in general use by
writers and judges who make no attempt at analyzing the problem accurately.
E.g., People v. Daniels, 18 Cal. App. 2d 340, 257 P.2d 1038 (1953); Commonwealth v. Babb, 166 Pa. Super. 63, 70 A d 660 (1950); Commonwealth v. Fine,
166 Pa. Super. 109, 70 A.2d 677 (1950); United States v. Combs, 73 F. Supp. 813
(E.D. Ky. 1947).
148 Halstead v. State, 41 NJ.L. 552, 596, 32 Am. Rep. 247 (1879); but see
State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617, 623 (1951), limiting the Halstead case;
La Russa v. State, 152 Fla. 504, 196 So. 302 (1940), two JJ. dissenting.
149 State v. Hennessy, 141 Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211 (1921), maximum penalty
ten years penitentiary and/or $5,000.00 fine; State v. Winger, 41 Wn.2d 229,
248 P.2d 555 (1952), maximum penalty twenty years penitentiary. That in
both cases the facts seem to point to an evil intent of the offenders may be
regarded as fortunate for the course of justice, but it does not alter the anomaly
of the rule.
150 Former § 2 of the German Penal Code, in force until the destruction
of dictatorship, 1945. And see RosENTHaL et al., DM Jusrm INDER SowjrrsscHmu
ZONE 44-57 (1952), as to the law in the Sovjet Zone of Germany.
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The categories above five are clearly healthier laws, the categories
below five are unsound laws, with absolute and dictatorial law as
the lowest form to which law can be degraded. The name "law"
for such a rule is hardly justified. The fourth category, as the law
in the majority of American states, is of particular interest, deserving much further exploration. Its shape is not encouraging. But
West Virginia law has emerged from the abyss of absolute criminal
liability. There may be hope that other jurisdictions will follow
suit.
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